استقلال یا پاسخگویی: تأملی بر نهاد نظارت قضایی در نظام حقوقی ایالات متحده | ||
| فصلنامه تحقیقات حقوقی | ||
| مقاله 11، دوره 28، شماره 3، شهریور 1404، صفحه 159-178 اصل مقاله (676.31 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.48308/jlr.2024.234859.2685 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| آیت اله جلیلی1؛ فرشید دهقان2؛ مهراد مومن* 3 | ||
| 1استادیار، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران | ||
| 2دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران | ||
| 3دانشجوی دکتری، دانشکده حقوق، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران (نویسنده مسئول) m.momen@stu.qom.ac.ir | ||
| چکیده | ||
| استقلال و پاسخگویی دو روی یک سکه در نظام قضایی تلقی میشوند؛ به یک معنا، این دو نه در تعارض، بلکه مکمل یکدیگر تعریف میشوند. استقلال قضات از سایر متولیان سیاستگذاری در جامعه، امکان تعلّل در تصمیمگیری، نادیدهانگاری برخی از ادله موجود، و صدور تصمیمات نادرست یا مبتنیبر قوانین غیرمرتبط را افزایش میدهد. قضات مستقل، بهرغم آنکه شرط لازم برای حکومت قانون محسوب میشوند، میتوانند تهدیدی برای آن نیز باشند؛ به یک معنا، اگر حاکمیت قضات تسری یابد، حکومت قانون تحقق نخواهد یافت. یافتههای این پژوهش که با روش توصیفی- تحلیلی و با تکیهبر ادبیات پژوهش و مشی متعارف در نظام حقوقی ایالات متحده آمریکا انجام پذیرفته است، حاکی از آن است که پاسخگویی قضایی شرط لازم، اما ناکافی برای تحقق حکومت قانون است. بهعلاوه، بسیاری از مفسران معتقدند که استقلال قضایی و پاسخگویی دمکراتیک نیز در تنشی آشتیناپذیر با یکدیگر قرار دارند. این درحالی است که پژوهش حاضر تأکید دارد که این آرمانهای رقیب، خود هدف نیستند، بلکه ابزاری برای یک هدف مهمترند که همان تحقق سیستم قضایی کارآمد با عملکرد مقبول است. معالوصف، بهدنبال دستیابی به این هدف، قانون اساسی ایالات متحده استقلال گستردهای به قضات داده است و درعینحال آنها را در نهادی قرار میدهد که در معرض نظارت سیاسی شدید هستند | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| نظارت قضایی؛ پاسخگویی قضایی؛ استقلال قضایی؛ نظام حقوقی ایالات متحده؛ مطالبات افکار عمومی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Independence versus Accountability: A Reflection on Judicial Oversight in the United States Legal System | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Ayatollah Jalili1؛ Farshid Dehghan2؛ Mehrad Momen3 | ||
| 1Assistant Professor, Faqulty of Law, Qom University, Qom, Iran | ||
| 2PhD, Faqulty of Law, Qom University, Qom, | ||
| 3PhD Candidate, Faqulty of Law, Qom University, Qom, Iran Corressponding Author Email: m.momen@stu.qom.ac.ir | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Beyond other power structures, it is the Judiciary that creates the most significant challenges and requirements within the framework of the doctrine of separation of powers. As Montesquieu and some jurists contended, the Judiciary, in contrast to the Legislature, has no restrictive function. This holds true insofar as it concerns ordinary judges, who are strictly bound by and committed to the law and lack the authority to adjudicate the validity of laws. However, this is not entirely the case for American-style supreme courts and constitutional courts, which can effectively confine the legislative authority of lawmakers within the boundaries of the Constitution. nevertheless, the separation of powers does not inherently entail courts' independence in general or constitutional courts in particular. Perhaps if there were a fused legislative and executive branch, both subject to the effective oversight of an independent constitutional court, this relationship would be observed more clearly. The most crucial doctrine in analyzing the legal accountability of government is the separation of powers. The essence of this doctrine lies in the Legislature enacting laws, the Executive enforcing them, and the Judiciary - within the framework of adjudicating individual disputes - determining whether the law has been correctly interpreted and applied. This tripartite division of functions prevents the excessive concentration of power in any single branch of government, enables each branch to counterbalance the others, and ensures that legal disputes concerning governmental authority are resolved with utmost integrity by an independent judiciary under the rule of law. The phrase "rule of law" is a slogan that has been invoked throughout history for numerous political purposes. The rule of law means that no individual, regardless of their position, is "above" the law. Hence, the emphasis on "accountability" is one of the cornerstones of good governance and a key issue. Holding political leaders publicly accountable is a fundamental characteristic of representative democracy. Here, the judge serves as an intermediary between the government and citizens. However, in this study, what matters is understanding how a judicial system balances concerns regarding independence with those regarding accountability – The question can be considered only after which one can ponder whether the system conducts this action in a manner that would yield an effective judiciary. If independence means freedom from the oversight of other government branches and voters, how can we prevent judicial negligence or abuse of the law? Judicial accountability is a fundamental democratic imperative in federal and state systems like the those of the United States. Simply put, judges must be accountable to the people for their role in upholding the Constitution through fair and impartial enforcement of the law. Yet, judicial accountability is a concept often misunderstood at best and abused at worst. It has become a rallying cry for those who, in reality, seek to dictate fundamental judicial outcomes. The notion of accountability is appealing in itself. Judges who reach decisions contrary to the will of the majority of other judges ought to be "accountable." Meanwhile, the Drafters embedded the concept of judicial independence within the judiciary as a means of safeguarding the rule of law. Judicial independence is a vital mechanism empowering judges to make decisions that may be unpopular yet correct, thereby affirming the principle that no person or group, however powerful, is above the law. It also sustains the ideal that the rule of law protects minorities from the tyranny of the majority. In addressing judicial oversight and the realization of independence or the emphasis on accountability by this structure, this study takes a deeper look at the U.S. legal system and its various dimensions. Judicial independence implies that the judiciary should not fear sanctions for the decisions it makes. Accordingly, an independent judiciary can protect individual rights against unlawful encroachment or abuse of power by the government. However, if this independence is exercised without restraint, it may itself become a source of irreparable harm. Thus, an independent judiciary must also be accountable for its actions. But assuming this independence, to whom is the judiciary accountable? Does the principle of governmental accountability apply to the judiciary as well? This study seeks to demonstrate that independence and accountability are interdependent and two sides of the same coin in the judicial system - in a sense, they are not contradictory but complementary. Judicial independence from other policymakers in society increases the potential for delayed decision-making, disregard for certain evidence, and erroneous or legally irrelevant rulings. Independent judges, though a necessary condition for the rule of law, can also pose a threat to it - in a sense, if judicial supremacy expands, the rule of law will not be realized. Despite extensive scholarly literature on judicial oversight in Iranian public law, the issue of independence and accountability, with an absolute emphasis on the U.S. legal system and relying solely on non-Iranian scholars, has been less explored. Therefore, this study employs a descriptive-analytical method, drawing on research literature and conventional approaches in the U.S. legal system, to examine this issue under several headings. First: What is the basis of accountability and its conceptual meaning? Next, we analyze the challenges between the role of the judicial structure in the U.S. presidential system and then elucidate what is known as public opinion and the nature of democracy. Finally, we examine and explain the stance of independence or accountability in the realm of judicial oversight. The findings of the study indicate that judicial accountability is a necessary but insufficient condition for realizing the rule of law. Moreover, many commentators argue that judicial independence and democratic accountability are intertwined in an irreconcilable tension. However, this study emphasizes that these competing ideals are not ends in themselves but means to a more significant goal: the realization of an efficient judicial system with acceptable performance. Nevertheless, in pursuit of this goal, the U.S. Constitution grants judges broad independence while placing them within an institution subject to intense political and public scrutiny. | ||
| کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
| Judicial Oversight, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Independence, US Legal System, Public Demands | ||
| مراجع | ||
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منابع کتاب ۱. طوسی، نظامالملک، ۴۴۱، گزیده سیاستنامه، انتخاب و شرح از جعفر شعار، تهران: قطره، 1375. References Books
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