سامانه مدیریت نشریات علمی دانشگاه شهید بهشتی

امری اسرمی, محمد, ابراهیمی, سید کاظم, کریمی گله دونی, فاطمه. (1403). اثر احتمال تقلب بر خطای ارزش‌گذاری: نقش مالکیت دولتی. , 14(47), 130-148. doi: 10.48308/jfmp.2025.237668.1445
محمد امری اسرمی; سید کاظم ابراهیمی; فاطمه کریمی گله دونی. "اثر احتمال تقلب بر خطای ارزش‌گذاری: نقش مالکیت دولتی". , 14, 47, 1403, 130-148. doi: 10.48308/jfmp.2025.237668.1445
امری اسرمی, محمد, ابراهیمی, سید کاظم, کریمی گله دونی, فاطمه. (1403). 'اثر احتمال تقلب بر خطای ارزش‌گذاری: نقش مالکیت دولتی', , 14(47), pp. 130-148. doi: 10.48308/jfmp.2025.237668.1445
امری اسرمی, محمد, ابراهیمی, سید کاظم, کریمی گله دونی, فاطمه. اثر احتمال تقلب بر خطای ارزش‌گذاری: نقش مالکیت دولتی. , 1403; 14(47): 130-148. doi: 10.48308/jfmp.2025.237668.1445

اثر احتمال تقلب بر خطای ارزش‌گذاری: نقش مالکیت دولتی

چشم انداز مدیریت مالی
دوره 14، شماره 47، 1403، صفحه 130-148    اصل مقاله (603.92 K)
نوع مقاله: علمی - پژوهشی
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.48308/jfmp.2025.237668.1445
نویسندگان
محمد امری اسرمی* 1؛ سید کاظم ابراهیمی2؛ فاطمه کریمی گله دونی3
1استادیار، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده اقتصاد، مدیریت و علوم اداری، دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران.
2گروه حسابداری، دانشکده اقتصاد، مدیریت و علوم اداری، دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران.
3گروه حسابداری، دانشگاه سمنان، سمنان، ایران.
چکیده
هدف: ارزش‌گذاری صحیح دارایی‌ها باعث تخصیص بهینه منابع سرمایه‌ای می‌شود و نبود دقت و صحت در ارزش‌گذاری سهام می‌تواند به عملکرد شرکت آسیب برساند و منافع سهامداران را به خطر بیاندازد. بنابراین، خطای قیمت‌گذاری به‌عنوان یک ناهنجاری مالی، فرضیه بازار کارا را تضعیف می‌کند. وقوع تقلب، سبب کاهش اطمینان و واکنش‌های منفی در بازار می‌شود. در این راستا، انتشار اخبار تقلب به شهرت شرکت و ثروت سهامداران آسیب می‌زند. در این شرایط، قیمت سهام، شرایط واقعی شرکت را منعکس نمی‌کند، بنابراین، افشای تقلب در شرکت، زمینه‌ساز خطای ارزش‌گذاری شرکت می‌شود. از سوی دیگر، امروزه مالکیت دولت به یک راهبرد نجات در کشورهای توسعه یافته و در حال توسعه تبدیل شده‌است. محدودیت محیط اطلاعاتی شرکت‌های دولتی، منجر به کاهش نقدشوندگی سهام این شرکت‌ها می‌شود، از سوی دیگر، مدیران شرکت‌های دولتی بر دست‌یابی به اهداف اجتماعی و سیاسی کوتاه‌مدت تمرکز دارند. شرکت‌های دارای مالکیت دولتی وظیفه کمک به دولت در بهبود رفاه جامعه را به عهده دارند. مالکیت دولتی شرکت‌ها، چه نقشی در این وضعیت ایفا می‌کند. این پژوهش رابطه بین احتمال تقلب و خطای ارزش‌گذاری را با تأکید بر نقش مالکیت دولتی بررسی می‌کند.
روش: این مطالعه بر مبنای اطلاعات واقعی بازار سهام و با گردآوری اطلاعات و گزارش‌های مالی شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار، انجام شده است. جامعه آماری پژوهش، شرکت‌های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی دوره هشت ساله از سال 1394 الی 1401 می‌باشد. پس از اعمال شرایط غربالگری منظم، 129 شرکت، 1032 سال – شرکت انتخاب شده است. خطای ارزش‌گذاری به پیروی از مطالعه روهدس-کروپف و همکاران (2005) و چانگ و همکاران (2013) و احتمال وجود تقلب به پیروی از بنیش (1999) و اردوغان و اردوغان (2020) اندازه گیری شد. پس از بررسی فرض‌های رگرسیون چند متغیره، با کمک الگوی داده‌های تابلویی با اثرات ثابت فرضیه‌ها آزمون شده‌است.
یافته‌ها: یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد احتمال وجود تقلب، خطای ارزش‌گذاری شرکت‌ها را به طور معناداری افزایش می‌دهد. با افزایش مالکیت دولتی در شرکت‌ها، اثر احتمال وجود تقلب بر خطای ارزش‌گذاری به‌طور معناداری افزایش می‌یابد.
نتیجه‌گیری: گزارش‌های مالی متقلبانه منجر به انتشار اطلاعات نادرست و کاهش اعتماد سرمایه‌گذاران در بازار می‌شود. همچنین بسیاری از تقلب‌ها و سوء استفاده‌ها به‌موقع کشف نمی‌شوند و همه موارد کشف شده گزارش نمی‌شوند. لذا، انتشار گزارش‌های ارتکاب تقلب در شرکت، واکنش منفی بازار سرمایه و افزایش هزینه‌های تأمین منابع را در پی دارد که موجب خطای ارزش‌گذاری اوراق‌بهادار شرکت می‌شود. از سوی دیگر، در شرکت‌های دولتی، اثر احتمال تقلب بر خطای ارزش‌گذاری سهام افزایش می‌یابد. به‌دلیل حمایت سیاسی دولت و محیط بسته شرکت‌های دارای مالکیت دولتی، شفافیت گزارشگری مالی کاهش‌یافته، عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی و احتمال گزارشگری مالی متقلبانه افزایش می‌یابد و به‌دلیل تضعیف سازوکارهای نظارت داخلی در شرکت‌ها فرصت ارتکاب تقلب و تضاد منافع را برای مدیریت فراهم می‌آورد. بنابراین، در شرکت‌های دولتی، احتمال خطای ارزش‌گذاری سهام افزایش می‌یابد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
مالکیت دولتی؛ احتمال تقلب؛ خطای ارزش‌گذاری
عنوان مقاله [English]
The Effect of the Possibility of Fraud on Misvaluation: The Role of Government Ownership
نویسندگان [English]
Mohammad Amri-Asrami1؛ Seyed Kazem Ebrahimi2؛ Fatemeh Karimi Gelehdoni3
1Assistant Professor, Accounting Department,, Faculty of Economics, Management,and Administrative Sciences, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran.
2Accounting Department, Faculty of Economics, Management and Administrative Sciences, Semnan University, Campus 1, Semnan, Zip Code: 35131-19111
3Accounting Department, Faculty of Economics, Management and Administrative Sciences, Semnan University, Campus 1, Semnan, Zip Code: 35131-19111
چکیده [English]
Objective: Correctly asset valuation leads to optimal allocation of capital resources, and lack of accuracy and precision in stock valuation can harm company performance and jeopardize shareholders' interests. So, mispricing, as a financial anomaly, undermines the efficient market hypothesis. The occurrence of fraud reduces confidence and causes negative reactions in the market. In this regard, the publication of fraud news damages the company's reputation and shareholders' wealth. Under these circumstances, the stock price fails to accurately represent the true state of the company, thus exposing fraudulent activities within the company lays the groundwork for the misvaluation. Today, governmental ownership has become a rescue strategy in developed and developing countries. The restricted information environment of governmental companies leads to a decrease in the liquidity of these companies' shares. On the other hand, managers of government companies focus on achieving short-term social and political goals. State-owned enterprises play a crucial role in assisting the government in enhancing societal welfare. How does the presence of state-owned companies influence the current circumstances? This study examines the relation between the likelihood of fraud and misvaluation, emphasizing the role of state ownership.
Method: This research was carried out utilizing actual stock market data and the financial statements of firms. The statistical population for this study comprises companies that were listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the eight-year span from 2015 to 2022. After applying regular screening conditions, 129 companies, 1032 observations have been selected. Misvaluation was measured following the study of Rhodes–Kropf et al. (2005) and Chang et al. (2013) and the probability of fraud was measured following Benish (1999) and Erdoğan and Erdoğan (2020). After examining the assumptions of multivariate regression, the hypotheses were tested using a panel data model with fixed effects.
Findings: The findings show that the probability of fraud significantly increases the misvaluation of companies. In state-owned companies, the effect of the probability of fraud on misvaluation is significantly intensified.
Conclusion: The issuance of fraudulent financial statements results in the propagation of misleading information, thereby diminishing investor trust in the market. Furthermore, numerous instances of fraud and misconduct go undetected for extended periods, and not all detected cases are subsequently reported. As a result, the publication of corporate fraud reports triggers a negative response within the capital market, resulting in heightened costs associated with resource provision. This escalation in costs ultimately results in a mispricing of the company's securities. Alternatively, in the context of state-owned firms, the probability of fraudulent activities significantly amplifies the misvaluation of stock prices. The support from the government, along with the closed nature of state-owned companies, contributes to diminished transparency in financial reporting. This situation exacerbates information asymmetry and heightens the likelihood of fraudulent financial activities. Moreover, the erosion of internal control mechanisms within these companies facilitates opportunities for fraudulent activities and conflicts of interest involving management. Hence, in state-controlled companies, the likelihood of stock misvaluation is heightened.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
Government ownership, possibility of fraud, misvaluation
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